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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Tony Blair has produced a very useful review of forms of good premiss-conclusion 
linkage other than deductive validity and inductive strength that have been recognized 
and appropriated within the field of informal logic over the past 30 years. His paper will 
be a useful reference. 
 I would like to begin my comments on his paper by registering my agreement 
with the fundamentals of his approach. First, although Blair correctly distinguishes 
reasoning from argument, he rightly notes that the novel forms of good linkage apply 
equally well to both. The standards for good inference in one’s own reasoning seem to be 
the same as the standards for good inference in arguments addressed to others, perhaps 
because in both cases the question is the same: do the reasons that serve as the basis 
transmit the appropriate kind of acceptability to the upshot? Second, at the highest level 
of generality, the distinctions between induction, deduction and other forms of “duction” 
are distinctions between different kinds of good linkage, not between different kinds of 
reasoning or different kinds of argument. Reasoning and argument do not come labelled 
as ‘deductive’ or ‘inductive’, and it is often a matter of decision by an evaluator which 
standard of inference appraisal to apply, as Robert Ennis has recently argued (Ennis, 
2001). At lower levels of generality, however, we are dealing with argument schemes or 
reasoning schemes, such as inductive generalization, reasoning by analogy, conductive or 
pros-and-cons reasoning, means-end reasoning, interpretation of a quoted passage, 
inference to the best explanation, and so forth. (Walton, 1996) has presented a long list of 
such argument schemes as appraisable by a presumptive or defeasible standard of 
inference appraisal. But in fact some of these schemes have instances that meet a variety 
of standards. An argument by analogy based on a tight determination relation, such as the 
rule that the first letter of the postal code of a Canadian address determines the province 
in which the address is located, has a conclusive inference. One based on a loose 
determination relation, such as the causal relationship between various features of a house 
and its current market value, has a non-conclusive inference, which in the case of a 
competent real estate appraisal would support a judgment that the current market value of 
the property being appraised is probably within a specified range. An argument by 
parallels of the sort to which John Wisdom draws our attention in his Proof and 
Explanation (Wisdom, 1991) creates in the best case a presumption that its conclusion is 
to be accepted. Thus there is no single standard of inference appraisal appropriate to all 
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arguments by analogy, if arguments by analogy are defined in the most general way as 
arguments that project a queried property from analogue cases to a target on the basis of 
properties that they are assumed to have in common. The same is true of other argument 
schemes. 
 Having registered my agreement with Blair’s basic framework, except for the 
caveat about argument schemes, I would like to lodge an objection to the presupposition 
of his title, that informal logic has its own distinctive logic. As Blair himself has stated, in 
a paper co-authored with Ralph Johnson, informal logic “is best understood as the 
normative study of argument. It is the area of logic which seeks to develop standards, 
criteria and procedures for the interpretation, evaluation and construction of arguments 
and argumentation used in natural language.” (Blair & Johnson, 1987, p.148; similarly, 
Johnson & Blair, 2000, p. 94) Blair’s present paper comes under the heading of standards 
and criteria for the evaluation of arguments used in natural language. Such standards will 
obviously include those developed in the logical tradition of the last 2,400 years. We 
should not expect informal logic to ignore work already done on what constitutes a good 
inference. Nor should we necessarily expect amendment or supplementation of this 
tradition to come from scholars who identify themselves as members of the informal 
logic community. In fact, of the six thinkers whose innovations Blair reviews, only one 
considered himself to be working in the field of informal logic when he introduced his 
innovation: Douglas Walton. And Walton’s work on presumptive reasoning, as he and 
Blair acknowledge, is largely derivative from the work of Pollock and of artificial 
intelligence researchers like Reiter on defeasible reasoning. Given this track record, we 
should not expect research in the field of informal logic to produce innovations about 
premiss-conclusion linkage. Nor should we expect it to develop proof systems for non-
conclusive consequence relations, with accompanying metatheorems concerning the 
soundness, completeness, decidability and other properties of such systems. There is a 
need for such developments, but they are the business of formal logic, not of informal 
logic. 
 Blair’s paper raises many interesting questions. I shall discuss only two of them. 
First, how are we to classify the ways in which an upshot can be legitimately inferred 
from a basis? Second, what can be said to supplement Blair’s brief characterization of 
deductive validity and inductive strength? 
 
2.  KINDS OF “DUCTION” 
 
Given the recognition in the logical tradition of deduction, induction, abduction and 
conduction as distinct forms of legitimate inference, it is useful to coin the word ‘duction’ 
(from the Latin ductio, meaning ‘a leading’) as the name of the genus of which these 
forms are species, or perhaps sub-species. As I shall use the word, a duction is a 
legitimate way of inferring an upshot from a basis. If the neologism is opaque, one could 
instead call the genus ‘followings’ and think of the species as ways of following. 
 How shall we divide the genus of duction or following? 
 We should not expect, I think, a tree of Porphyry, with a cut at each division into 
a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive species, proceeding steadily and 
gracefully to the infimae species that cannot be further divided. For there are various 
bases on which ductions can be divided, and these bases cut across one another. One 
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basis of division is the formality or non-formality of the duction. A formal duction is a 
way of following that can be brought under a rule of inference that is purely formal, in 
the sense that its statement consists entirely of logical expressions. For example, formal 
deductive validity, if defined with reference to a formal language, is the property of an 
argument that it has no counter-model, i.e. no interpretation of its extra-logical constants 
in which the basis is true and the upshot not true. (Formal validity can be defined for 
natural-language arguments in terms of their symbolizability by a formally valid 
argument in a formal language.) Note that not all formal ductions are deductive. 
Inferences in accordance with Bayes’ theorem are formal but non-deductive. Non-formal 
ductions cannot be brought under a formal rule of inference, but can be brought under 
one that is material, in the sense that its statement contains at least one expression that is 
not logical. In contemporary philosophical logic, material consequence seems to be 
defined as a relationship dependent on the meaning of the basis and the upshot, as in such 
simple examples as ‘Jones is a bachelor, so Jones is male’. But one can allow ductions in 
which the non-formal generalization that licenses the inference is not a conceptual truth 
but a substantive generalization, as in the argument ‘This object is made of wood, so it 
will float in water’. In this example, the inference-licensing generalization that objects 
made of wood float in water is a nomic (law-like) generalization that supports counter-
factual conditionals (‘if this wooden object were put in water, it would float’). But even 
purely accidental generalizations can license inferences; for example, it follows from the 
fact that Abraham Lincoln was president of the United States that he was a man, since all 
U.S. presidents to date have been men. But the counter-factual conditional that, if Walter 
Mondale had been elected president of the United States in 1984 and had died in office, 
being succeeded to the office by his vice-presidential running mate Geraldine Ferraro, 
then Geraldine Ferraro would have been a man, is obviously false. 
 Another basis for distinguishing ductions, cutting across that according to their 
formality or non-formality, has to do with their defeasibility status. Pollock, for example, 
distinguishes conclusive ductions from defeasible ductions. On the usual understanding, 
all inferences licensed by exceptionless generalizations—whether they are logical, 
conceptual, nomic or accidental—are conclusive, and thus non-defeasible. But 
connectionist scruples can generate kinds of conclusive duction that cannot be rebutted 
(i.e. shown to be false in a way consistent with the truth of the premisses) but can be 
undermined. According to one connectionist conception of conclusive duction 
(Hitchcock, 1998), an upshot follows conclusively from a given basis if and only if there 
is some general feature of the argument from the basis to the upshot rules out that the 
basis is true while the upshot is not true, even though it does not rule out the basis is true 
and does not rule out that the upshot is not true. The latter qualifications are designed to 
rule out trivial ways of satisfying the requirement for conclusive duction, for example by 
the basis having a general feature that rules out its truth (e.g. ‘Socrates is an immortal 
human, so all wine is sweet’) or the upshot having a general feature that rules out its 
falsehood (e.g. ‘Wine is wine, because Socrates was an Athenian’). A consequence of the 
rejection of trivial conclusive duction is that additional information can undermine an 
otherwise conclusive inference. For example, it follows from the premiss that a certain 
tree is a pine that it is a conifer. But if one adds to the basis the additional information 
that it is not a pine (thus producing an inconsistent database), the proposition that the tree 
is a conifer no longer follows, for any general feature that rules out the basis is true while 
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the upshot is not true also rules out that the basis is true. The new information of course 
does not show that the conclusion is false; it merely undermines the inference. If we 
recognize ductions that are conclusive but underminable, then the basic division along the 
axis of defeasibility is between rebuttable and non-rebuttable ductions. A rebuttable 
duction is subject to a rebutting (or, in Pinto’s happy phrase, “overriding”—Pinto, 2001, 
pp. 102-103) defeater, a circumstance in which the basis remains true but the output is not 
true. Rebuttable ductions are those for which it is appropriate to qualify the conclusion 
with a word like ‘probably’, ‘presumably’ or ‘possibly’. We could thus divide rebuttable 
ways of following into those that make the upshot probable given the truth of the basis, 
those that create a presumption of its acceptability given the truth of the upshot, and those 
that establish its worthiness to be given serious consideration given the truth of the 
upshot. There might be other ways of following coordinate with these three, and each of 
them might be divisible into sub-species. 
 
3. DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 
 
Blair assumes that deductive validity and inductive strength are two ways in which an 
illative move from some “basis” to its “upshot” can be good. But both these concepts are 
more problematic than he acknowledges.  
He glosses deductive validity, labeled as “entailment” of the upshot by the basis, as the 
impossibility of the upshot’s being false if the basis is true. The gloss raises a number of 
questions, which are independent of Blair’s additional requirement for a good deductive 
illative move that the basis is different from the upshot. First, Blair’s gloss presupposes 
that both the upshot and the basis are truth-bearers, but some recent work (e.g. Pinto, 
2006; Ennis, 2006) has questioned this presupposition, and proposed instead that the 
upshot is an entitlement with respect to a truth-bearer (or, in the case of reasoning, the 
mental analogue of an illocutionary act which the reasoning entitles one to perform). If 
this proposal is accepted, some modification to the conceptualization of deductive 
validity will be required. Second, the gloss needs clarification of what meaning the word 
‘if’ has in this context. If it is construed truth-functionally, then it follows that any illative 
move to an upshot that cannot be false is a good one, for example, the move from ‘Pluto 
is a planet’ to ‘2 + 2 = 4’. It also follows that any illative move from a basis that cannot 
be true is a good one, for example, the move from ‘you are sitting and you are not sitting’ 
to ‘Tom is in the corner’. There is a long history of skepticism about whether such illative 
moves from a completely irrelevant basis are really good, skepticism that has produced 
for example the work of C. I. Lewis on strict implication (Lewis, 1918, 1920) Anderson 
and Belnap’s conceptualization of relevant entailment (Anderson & Belnap, 1975; 
Anderson, Belnap, & Dunn, 1992), and Neil Tennant’s classical and intuitionist relevant 
logics (Tennant, 1987). Relevantists (e.g. Read, 1988) tend to describe entailment as the 
impossibility of the upshot’s being false while the basis is true. Third, the gloss needs 
clarification of what sort of impossibility is intended. If it is logical impossibility, then 
some clarification of what constitutes logical impossibility is required. If deductive 
validity is to include not just logical or formal validity but also what some have called 
‘semantic validity’ or ‘material validity’ (Brandom, 1998, 2001), then a broader sense of 
impossibility is needed. One way to clarify this sense is to appeal to the meaning of the 
basis and the upshot (assuming that these are linguistic items, not the semantic correlates 
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of linguistic items) as that which rules out the situation that the basis is true and the 
upshot false. Such a clarification gives rise to further difficulties in determining what 
counts as part of the meaning and what counts as a substantive claim—for example, 
whether ‘water’ by definition means a chemical compound whose molecules each consist 
of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen. One could accommodate all three of 
the concerns that I have just mentioned by rephrasing Blair’s gloss on the concept of 
deductive validity as follows: the meaning of the basis and the upshot rules out in a non-
trivial way that the truth-bearing content of the basis is true while the truth-bearing 
content of the upshot false. In this gloss, the phrase ‘in a non-trivial way’ needs further 
explication. If the meaning of the basis does not rule out that its truth-bearing content is 
true and the meaning of the upshot does not rule out that its truth-bearing content is false, 
then non-triviality is guaranteed. A more complicated explication is needed to allow for 
relevant deduction from a basis whose truth-bearing content cannot be true or to an 
upshot whose truth-bearing content cannot be false. A fourth question about Blair’s gloss 
concerns illative moves where the upshot or basis does not involve a commitment to the 
truth of a truth-bearer, for example moves from a conditional command and the 
satisfaction of its condition to an unconditional command. Such moves can perhaps be 
brought under a general conception of entailment by considering their alethic analogues, 
such as the move from a conditional ought statement and the satisfaction of its condition 
to an unconditional ought statement. 
As to inductive strength, Blair glosses this as “the quantifiable degree that the basis 
makes it probable that the upshot is true or worthy of acceptance”. This gloss avoids 
many of the problems of his gloss of deductive validity. The phrase “makes it probable” 
rules out trivial satisfaction of the definition by the upshot’s being probable 
independently of the basis or by the basis being improbable. In contrast to the concept of 
impossibility, the concept of probability does not require specification. Further, the 
addition of the phrase “or worthy of acceptance” allows for upshots that do not involve 
commitment to the truth of a truth-bearer. In cases where there is such a commitment, the 
possibility that the basis or upshot is not a truth-bearer can be handled by talking about 
their truth-bearing content, as with deductive validity. There are however new difficulties 
with conceptualizing inductive strength. First, the probability of an upshot given a basis is 
always relative to background information, which should in principle be specifiable. For 
example, in playing bridge the probability that one’s right-hand opponent has the king of 
a certain suit given that it is in neither one’s own nor one’s partner’s hand is 0.5 in the 
absence of further relevant information, but close to 1 if the opposing team has only 12 
high-card points between them and one’s right-hand opponent made an opening bid, 
which usually means at least 12 high-card points. To accommodate this relativity, Carnap 
proposed that, “in the application of inductive logic to a given situation, the total 
evidence available must be taken as a basis for determining the degree of confirmation.” 
(Carnap, 1962, p. 211) The interpretation and rationale of Carnap’s so-called “total 
evidence requirement” are a matter of ongoing controversy (see for example McLaughlin, 
1970), but some acknowledgement of relativity to background information is a 
requirement of any adequate conception of an inductively good inference. Second, many 
of the forms of reasoning and argument that are standardly taken to be appraisable in 
terms of inductive strength (universal generalization, statistical generalization, inductive 
extrapolation) cannot be assigned a quantitative degree to which the basis makes the 
5 
DAVID HITCHCOCK 
upshot probable, unless there is additional background information. Thus, one cannot 
compute any definite degree to which a generalization or extrapolation is made probable 
by the observed uniformity in some respect of a proper subset of some class of objects 
(such as marbles in a jar), unless one has further background information or makes 
further assumptions (Hitchcock, 1999). And, notoriously, techniques of statistical 
inference allow one to compute the margin of error around the frequency of occurrence of 
a property within a certain “universe” or “population” within which there is a probability 
of .95 (“19 times out of 20”) that the frequency of a property in a sample of specified size 
randomly selected from it will occur, but one cannot compute from the observed sample 
frequency any definite probability that the population frequency will be within some 
specified interval around it. Bayes’ theorem, which is at the heart of inductive logic, is 
mathematically unassailable, given its assumptions, but applying the theorem requires a 
prior probability of the upshot and prior and posterior likelihoods of the basis, numbers 
that in most real-life situations we do not know. 
A further complication of Blair’s initial claim that deductive validity (combined with a 
difference between the upshot and the basis) and inductive strength make for illative 
goodness is that these properties, however they are glossed, are insufficient. If a basis 
entails an upshot distinct from it, but it is completely unclear that it does so, then the 
illative move from the basis to the upshot is not good. To take an example from 
arithmetic, we know that the Peano axioms in second-order logic completely characterize 
the natural numbers 0, 1, 2 and so on—in the sense that any property of the natural 
numbers that can be stated in the vocabulary of those axioms follows necessarily from 
them. Hence, if Goldbach’s conjecture is true, that every even number is the sum of two 
prime numbers, then there is a deductively valid move from the Peano axioms as basis to 
Goldbach’s conjecture as upshot. Similarly, if Goldbach’s conjecture is false, then there 
is a deductively valid move from the Peano axioms as basis to the denial of Goldbach’s 
conjecture as upshot. But at present nobody knows whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true 
or false—mathematicians have not yet solved this problem, despite more than 250 years 
of trying (with a million-dollar prize on offer during two of those years). A proof of 
Goldbach’s conjecture or its denial must not only involve deductively valid reasoning 
from the axioms of arithmetic to the theorem, but must involve steps that human 
reasoners know are deductively valid. (A complication of this example is that, since any 
consistent second-order logic is incomplete, the logic being used to prove the theorem 
may not permit one to deduce it from the axioms, even though in fact it follows from 
them.) The same point can be made about inductively strong inferences. (Hamblin, 1970) 
expressed the point as the requirement that an upshot follow “reasonably immediately” 
and “clearly” from its basis. But this requirement is not the end of the story, because there 
is no well-established general account of when a deductive or inductive link between 
basis and upshot is reasonably immediate and clear. In a system of deductive or inductive 
logic, there are basic rules of inference, and one can stipulate that an inference in a proof 
within that system is good if and only if it is in accordance with those basic rules, or with 
derived rules that have been established in the development of the system. Generalization 
on this special type of situation leads one to the dialectical criterion of linkage adequacy 
that Hamblin ended up endorsing: “The passage from premisses to conclusion must be of 
an accepted kind.” (Hamblin, 1970, p. 245) If we adopt this dialectical framework, then 
we can interpret Blair’s critical review of the informal logic literature as an inquiry into 
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what kinds of “passage” that are neither deductively valid nor inductively strong we 
informal logicians accept (or at least are being encouraged by our peers to accept). 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
To sum up, Blair has given us an extremely valuable overview of post-war proposals for 
acceptable types of linkage that are neither deductively valid nor inductively strong. As 
far as I can tell, his summary is quite accurate. One notable omission is the set of 
argumentative schemes extracted by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Obrechts-Tyteca 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958) from the rhetorical, philosophical and literary 
tradition  of European civilization. 
 I have endorsed Blair’s view that the types of duction are the same for reasoning 
and for argument, and that at the highest level of generality we are in fact dealing with 
kinds of legitimate inference, or standards of inference appraisal, rather than with kinds 
of reasoning or kinds of argument. But at lower levels of generality, I have claimed, the 
levels where talk of ‘argument schemes’ or ‘reasoning schemes’ is appropriate, we are 
dealing with kinds of reasoning or argument, kinds whose appropriate standard of 
inference appraisal may in fact vary from one instance to another. I have also registered 
my disagreement with the presupposition of the title of Blair’s paper that informal logic 
has its own distinctive logic. I proposed the term ‘duction’ as a generic term for all 
legitimate kinds of inference, taking advantage of the existing use of the terms  
‘deduction’, ‘induction’, ‘abduction’ and ‘conduction’ for specific kinds of legitimate 
inference. I argued that ductions cannot be classified in a Poprhyrian genus-species tree, 
but fall into a matrix structure, with their division according to the formality or type of 
non-formality of the inference cutting across their division according to their rebuttability 
or non-rebuttability. I then elaborated at some length on the commonly accepted forms of 
legitimate inference, deduction and induction, arguing that what constituted a legitimate 
deduction and what constituted a legitimate induction was more complicated than Blair’s 
brief description acknowledged. 
 There is much more to be said about the specifics of the forms of inference 
recognized and discussed in Blair’s very useful review and comparison. 
 
link to response link to paper
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